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Thefollowing essay is adnptedfrom
uA Visiting Scholar Considers The Law
and the Humanities," which appeared in
The Key Reporter of Phi Beta Kappa
in summer 1998as a partial report of
the author5 year us a Phi Beta Kappa
Visiting Scholar The selection here is a
summary of a lecture the author
delivered during his travels to eight
colleges and universities throughout the
United States. A more complete version
will appear in From Expectation to
Experience: Essays on Law and Legal
Education, a collection of the authofs
essays being published this year by the
University of Michigan Press.
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BoyD WHITE

g e t us begin by considering three
fragments of works that would be the
object of study in the humanities: a piece
of Emily DickmsonS famous poem,
"Because I could not stop for Deathn;the
pair of scales in the well-known painting
by Vermeer at the National Gallery in
Washington, D.C., in which a woman
stands at a table on whch gold coins are
scattered, holding those scales pensively in
her hand; and the location of the door in
the chapel at Ronchamp by Le Corbusier,

chuah n&irtha;l at the west end. With
these I compare a quotation b r n Bmwn v.
%oddaf Educuth The question is: What
cow~tiortscan be drawn among these
&oqiitems, or between what we do
when &vestudy and respond to the first set
of items and what we do when we study
and respond to the last?
Let, us start with the first set, trying to
work out what it is that humanists typically
do; then we can turn to the activities of the
law, which at first seem utterly different but
whlch in the end reveal surprising
similarities.
The first and most important
characteristic of humanistic work is that it
:j fcuses on a text or other artifact made by
- athers, in other cultural circumstances, and
~ ~ f w ainlthe
l ~past. The distinctive concern
:a
' $ the humanist is with the meaning of the
Wfact we examine - that is, its meaning
the maker and the original audience,
i'drtd its meaning to the present viewer and
&fie audience today
Because each of the items with which
!.we
$5. begin is a fragment of something larger,
ihe first task is to define the "whole" of
,J
cpch the item is a part - the whole
, or painting, or church. But h
ach leads us to other wholes - the
e oeuvre of the maker, or the whole
,,,aporld of poems or paintings or c h u ~ h e s
"at
defined the expectations of the maker
?*d the original audience, indeed the
R\&hole cultural context against which it is a
tjxrformance.
," Thus, to understand Vermeer we need
$!to understand somethg of the school of
; Dutch-painterswho preceded him and
],:'beganto represent, as he did, the informal
7'interiors of bourgeois homes and the
,- ordmary lives of the people who lived
there, including the women.
To understand Dickinson, we need to
understand something of the sentimentalizing conventions governing 19th century
American verse, especially women's verse,
for only then will we see her resisting
some, using others, to make a verse that is
extraordinarilyher own. In the poem I use,
for example, the comfortable way "Death
is represented at the beginning, as a kindly
gentleman neutralized by his companion
"Immortality,"is consistent with the
tendencies of her day, but the poem
reverses these, and ends with great
blea!mess, converting "Immortality," with
all of its promise of heaven, into "~terni$"
something very different indeed.
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Because I m
z
d not stop for Death He kindly stopped for me The Carriage held but just Ourselves And Immortality.
But she turns the tables by concludmg:

Since then -'tis Centuries -and yet
Feels shorter than the DayIfirst surmised the Horses' Heads
Were toward Eternity Much the same is true of Le Corbusier,
for h~ church, which seems so odd at first,
like nothing one has ever seen - on the
outside like a sculpted haystack, on the
inside dark and disorienting - turns out,
as we work our way into it, to have the
same basic architectural form as other
churches. Initial strangeness proves familiar
and illuminating. But neither part of the
experience, neither the strangeness nor the
familiarity would be available to one who
did not know what to expect of the design
of the church in this culture.
Humanistic study thus involves
attunement to the culture and context
against whch the work in question is a
performance. Like travel to a dBerent
country, the experience of this attunement
changes our own i m a p t i o n , and we
return to our own world with different
eyes. It is, in fact, part of the point of such
work to expose and thus subject to the
possibility of criticism some of our own
unconscious presuppositions and attitudes.
The meaning of a work of the kind we
are discussing is thus fundamentally
experiential in kind: the surprise into
familiarity that Le Corbusier's church at
Ronchamp offers, for example, or the
despair enacted in the shift from
"Immortality"to "Eternity," or the
frustration of aslung questions about the
Venneer painting that it will never answer.
The experience is never complete; it is not
the same for everyone; and to work our
way into it is an activity that changes our
own mind and imaption.
To summarize, then, we can say that the
work of the humanities is about artifacts
and texts from other cultures and times;
that it is about their meaning, as fully
understood as possible; that this meaning
requires an understanding of the context
against which the original work is a
performance; that t h s meaning cannot be
fully restated, both because of the gap
between one culture and another and
because of die gap between different parts
of the self.

It qmy seem at b
t none at all: The law
dl,the bureaucratic ann of a
bumtlmac state; it is about consequams
or results in the reaI world, not abom texts
or language or t%rcc world d the
h p t i o n ; it is about power, not beauty
or mrh. It is very often =en as a branch of
public pollcyVin which legal questions are
collapsed into questions of social science or
political preference. More familiar15
perhaps, law is often seen simply as a set of
rules, to be obeydd or disobeyed. Of
course, the law am be imagined,
sometimes usefrz11y,in each of these ways,
especially when viewed from the outside.
But when it is viewed from the inside, by
someone who lives on its terms, it can be
seen as a field of life and practice, as a set
of intellectual and imaginative activities,
and, as such, far closer to the humanities
than we normally imagine.
To take one crucial aspect of their work,
lawyes, like humanists, are constantly
concerned with the understandmg and
interpretation of texts that are made by
others, in other cultural circumtan:ces, and
usually in the past; and the lawyers'
interest is always in what these texts mean,
or should be said to mean. Consider*for
example, the passage from B r m v. Board of
Education, to which I alluded earlier:
W e conclude that in the field of public
edumtion the doctrine of 'separate but
equal' has no place. Separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore,
we hold that the p h & and others
s ~ l situated
y
for whom the actions
have been brought are, by reasons of the
segregation complained of, deprived of the
equal protection of the laws g u m t e e d by
the Fourteenth Amendment."
Like the examples given earlier, this is a
fragment of a larger text, and the lawyerb
first task is to locate it in the larger whole
of which it is a part. In tlus case, the
meaning of the phrase "in the field of
education" raises serious questions: Does
the Court mean to limit its holding to
public education, permitting segegation in
restroom, parks, and swimming pools, for
example? Or is the educational aspect of
thLs case really an accident? Or is there
some other explanation for this hguage?
Such questions will carry us both to the
rest of the opinion and beyond it, to its
larger context.
In law as in the humanities, the relevant
''whole" thus expands to include not
&, &er
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merely the single work of whch a passage
is a part, but the range of contexts against
whlch it is a performance, here including
earlier cases relied on as authority for
segregation by race, like the infamous
PZessy v. Ferguson; cases that cut the other
way like Sweat v. Painter, which insisted
that "equality" meant full educational
equality and not simply equal equipment
or facdities; the language of the Fourteenth
Amendment itself; the debates about its
adoption; the lustory giving rise to it; and
contemporaneous debates in the public
arena about states' rights and about the
evils of segregation.
Like the poem, the church, and the
painting, the opinion can d y be read as a
response to its preexisting world, against
which it is a perfomnce. This meam, in
turn, that the meaning of the opinion is,
despite appearances, not essentially
propositional but experiential in kind: It is
&rformance against-abackground, and
understanding the opinion requires
attunement to h a t background.
The difficulties of reading a cme in its
origmal context are greatly increased when
we try to translate h e meaning we are
k g m i n g to understand into the presem,
and thus inho a world differem not only
' from &at of the case itself, but from any
that was then imaped. What does Brown
mean today! The promise it held out, of an
1 integrated society within a sin@
generation, and an end to racial hawed and
contempt, can now be seen as a hollow
one. Of course, many &can American
students do go to integrated schools,and
to integrated colleges, but it cannot be
denied that a great many schools are
effectively segregated, not in the first
instance by law but by residential patterns.
Furthermore, there are those who want
schools that will focus upon Ahcan
American cuZture, seeking to instin pride
and disciplinie a lond of proposed selfsegregation on he grwnds of better
education -which complicates the basic
premise of B r m , that htegration is an
. inherently p a d thing.
I . . m he question of present meaning that
probably has the most bite at the moment
is that of afFimtive action: Is the prcnnise
of Brown fulfilled merely by forbidding the
state to segregate by law, or does it require
or at least p e d r affmtive state
action to end the partem of m ~ l
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e main point remains,

which is that in both the law
and the humanities we are
struggling with problems of
meaning, of cultural
difkrence, of the authority
of different languages\
dominance and abuse that have
characterized American society nearly from
the beginning?-Ordoes Brown$ hostility
toward racial seg-regation support the view
that the state should be prohibited from
drawing raclal lines, even those that benefit
the minority? These are questions Brown
raises but does not answer; in finding or
rnalang answers to them, the law will seek
simultaneously to be true to Brown and,
of necessity, to give it new meaning in a
new world.
When we look back to Brown and ask
what it means for the present, it is not
enough, then, for us to try to understand
this gesture in the context in whch it
occurred; we must translate it from one
world to another world, and, in translating,
change its meaning.
To generalize quickly from this all too
brief summary, it is evident that, ljke the
humanities, the law takes as its subject
texts or a d c t s made by others, in other
cultural circumstances, and in some way in
the past; that the law is concerned with
their meaning, in the first instance to the
lawmakers and the world they addressed,
in the second instance to "us," that is, the
present world; that this meaning is
fundamentally performative and
experiential in land,inhering in a
performance against a context; that this
meaning cannot be reflected without
distortion in our world and language; that
its meaning to "usnis therefore a translation
that entails a transformation, camed on
under simultaneous and opposed fidelities
to the origmal and to the world into whch
it is canied. The readmg of texts in the law
is thus an art in many ways kthe art of
reading humanistic texts.
Of course, there is more to say on this
subject, for the law has its own constraints
and its own si&icances. But tke most
notable distinction the East that it is an
exerdse of officdpower -- does not much
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affect what 1 say,e x c q , to make it even
more important that the process of thought
and imagination by which legal texts are
read be sensible, wise, and good. The main
point remains, which is that in both the
law and the humanities we are stru&ing
with problems of meaning, of cultural
,'I
difference, of the authority of different
j
languages. One of my deepest beliefs is that ,-,
to read the. work of a mind engaged wit4
one form of this struggle may help us to . '
understand a mind engaged in another,
and help us confront our own languages,
uncertainties, and translations as well. As
lawyers, we have much to learn from the
efforts of others in other forms; and
perhaps it works the other way, too I
that is, painters, poets, and architects have
something to learn from\theirsister
discipline, the law.
i
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a d adjungt. projessor oj classical studies. As
the national Phi Beta Kappa VisitingScholar
durie-the academic year 1997-98, he visited
and lectured at eight colleges and universities .
across the United States. He is a graduate of 4
Amherst College, Harvard Lmu School, and
Harvanl G r h t e School, and spent a year ar
a Sheldon Fellow in Europe. He has practiced
law in Boston a d taught at the University of
Colorado Law School and the University of
1
Chicago, when he wus a professor in the Jizw $1
School, the College, a d on the Committee on '11
the Ancient Mediterranean World. His books 4,,.
indude Acts of Hope: The Creation of
Authority in Literature, Law and Politics
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